To construct a suitable and secure proxy re-signature scheme is not an easy job, up to now, there exist only three schemes, one is proposed by Blaze et al. [6] at EUROCRYPT 1998, and the others are proposed by Ateniese and Hohenberger [2] at ACM CCS 2005. However, none of these schemes is proved in the standard model (i.e., do not rely on the random oracle heuristic). In this paper, based on Waters' approach [19] , we first propose a multi-use bidirectional proxy re-signature scheme, denoted as S mb , which is existentially unforgeable in the standard model. And then, we extend S mb to be a multi-use bidirectional ID-based proxy re-signature scheme, denoted by S id−mb , which is also existentially unforgeable in the standard model. Both of these two proposed schemes are computationally efficient, and their security bases on the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption.
Introduction
Proxy re-signature schemes, introduced by Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss [6] , and formalized later by Ateniese and Hohenberger [2] , allow a semi-trusted proxy to transform a delegatee's signature into a delegator's signature on the same message by using some additional information. The proxy, however, cannot generate arbitrary signatures on behalf of either the delegatee or the delegator. Generally speaking, a proxy re-signature scheme has eight desirable properties [2] , though none of existing schemes satisfies all properties, see Table 1 . 1. Unidirectional: In an unidirectional scheme, a re-signature key allows the proxy to transform A's signature to B's but not vice versa. In a bidirectional scheme, on the other hand, the re-signature key allows the proxy to transform A's signature to B's as well as B's signature to A's.
Multi-use:
In a multi-use scheme, a transformed signature can be re-transformed again by the proxy. In a single-use scheme, the proxy can transform only the signatures that have not been transformed.
Private Proxy:
The re-signature key can be kept secret by the proxy in a private proxy scheme, but can be recomputed by observing the proxy passively in a public proxy scheme. 4. Transparent: In a transparent scheme, a signature on the same message signed by the delegator is computationally indistinguishable from a signature transformed by a proxy. 5. Key-Optimal: In a key-optimal scheme, a user is required to protect and store only a small constant amount of secrets no matter how many signature delegations the user gives or accepts. 6. Non-interactive: The delegatee is not required to participate in a delegation process. Due to the transformation function, proxy re-signature schemes are very useful and can be applied in many applications, including simplifying key management [6] , providing a proof for a path that has been taken, managing group signatures, simplifying certificate management [2] , constructing a Digital Rights Management (DRM) interoperable system [18] . However, as mentioned in [2] , "Finding suitable and secure proxy re-signature schemes required a substantial effort. Natural extensions of several standard signatures were susceptible to the sort of problems." To our best knowledge, there are only three proxy re-signature schemes, the first one is a bidirectional, multi-use, and public proxy scheme, proposed by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss at Eurocrypt 1998 [6] , and the left two are both proposed by Ateniese and Hohenberger at ACM CCS 2005 [2] . One of them is a multi-use bidirectional scheme, and the other is a single-use unidirectional scheme.
However, there exist two disadvantages in the above three schemes.
• All of these three schemes are only proven secure in the random oracle model, i.e., the proof of security relies on the random oracle heuristic. However, it has been shown that some schemes are proven secure in the random oracle model, but are trivially insecure under any instantiation of the oracle [9, 5] . Up to now, there are many signatures proven secure in the standard model, such as [10, 12, 3, 4, 19, 20] . It is natural to ask whether we can construct a new proxy re-signature scheme which can be proved in the standard model. • The public keys in these three schemes are arbitrary strings unrelated to their owner's identity. A certificate issued by an authority is needed to bind the public key to its owner's identity before the public key is used by others. This creates complexity of certificate management, though proxy re-signature schemes can be used to simplify certificate management. A natural solution to this disadvantage is to apply ID-based cryptography [17] . In ID-based cryptography, a user's unique ID such as an email address is also the user's public key. The corresponding private key is computed from the public key by a Private Key Generator (PKG) who has the knowledge of a master secret. As a result, complexity of certificate management can be eliminated. We can use the method in [11] to convert any proxy re-signature into an ID-based proxy re-signature. However, as mentioned in [15] , this method expands the size of signature, and increases the complexity of verification. We hope that we get an ID-based proxy re-signature by a direct construction. In this paper, we attempt to propose a new proxy re-signature scheme which recovers the above two disadvantages.
Our Contribution
In this paper, based on Waters' approach [19] , we first propose the first proxy re-signature scheme which is existentially unforgeable in the standard model, we denote it as S mb . S mb satisfies bidirectional, multi-use, private proxy, transparent properties. And then we proposed the first ID-based proxy re-signature which is existentially unforgeable in the standard model, we denote it as S id−mb . S id−mb also satisfies bidirectional, multiuse, private proxy, transparent properties. Actually, S id−mb can be considered as an ID-based extension of S mb . As the schemes in [19] , both of our proposed schemes are constructed in bilinear groups, and proven secure under the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. The only drawback of our proposed schemes is the relatively large size of its public parameters inheriting from Waters' approach [19] . However, we can use the techniques of Naccache [14] and Sarkar and Chatterjee [16] to reduce the size of the public parameters.
Paper Organization
The remaining paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the definitions of (ID-based) proxy resignatures and their security. And then we present S mb , S id−mb and their security proofs in Section 3. Finally, We conclude the paper in Section 4.
Definitions
The security notions in this section are all for existential unforgeablility under an adaptive chosen message (and identity) attack. That is, a valid forgery should be a valid signature on a new message, which is not signed by the signer before. These security models can be easily extended to cover strong unforgeability [1] , where a valid forgery should be a valid signature which is not computed by the signer. However, our concrete schemes do not enjoy security in this stronger sense, since an adversary can easily modify existing signatures into new signatures on same message.
Bidirectional Proxy Re-Signature
In this subsection, we briefly review the definitions about bidirectional proxy re-signatures. The security notion in this subsection is for existential unforgeability under an adaptive chosen message attack, which is weaker than that in [2] . We refer the reader to [2] for details.
Definition 1 A bidirectional proxy re-signature scheme is a tuple of (possibly probabilistic) polynomial time algorithms (KeyGen, ReKey, Sign, ReSign, Verify), where:
• (KeyGen, Sign, Verify) are the same as those in the standard digital signatures 1 .
• On input (sk A , sk B ), the re-signature key generation algorithm, ReKey, outputs a key rk A↔B for the proxy, where sk A and sk B are the secret key of A and B, respectively.
• On input rk A↔B , a public key pk A , a message m, and a signature σ, the re-signature function, ReSign, outputs a new signature σ on message m corresponding to pk B , if Verify(pk A , m, σ) = 1 and ⊥ otherwise.
Correctness. For any message m in the message space and any key pairs (pk, sk), (pk , sk ) ← KeyGen(1 k ), let σ = Sign(sk, m) and rk ← ReKey(sk, sk ). Then the following two conditions must hold:
Verify(pk, m, σ) = 1 and Verify(pk , m, ReSign(rk, pk, m, σ)) = 1.
Unlike the security notion in [2] , we define security for bidirectional proxy re-signature schemes by the following game between a challenger and an adversary: (Note that we adopt the method in [8] to define the security notion of bidirectional proxy re-encryption schemes: static corruption, i.e., in this security notion, the adversary has to determine the corrupted parties before the computation starts, and it does not allow adaptive corruption of proxies between corrupted and uncorrupted parties.)
Queries. The adversary adaptively makes a number of different queries to the challenger. Each query can be one of the following.
• Uncorrupted Key Generation O U KeyGen : Obtain a new key pair as (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1 k ). The adversary is given pk.
• Corrupted Key Generation O CKeyGen : Obtain a new key pair as (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1 k ). The adversary is given pk and sk.
• Re-Signature key Generation O ReKey : On input (pk, pk ) by the adversary, where pk, pk were generated before by KeyGen, return the re-signature key rk pk↔pk = ReKey(sk, sk ), where sk, sk are the secret keys that correspond to pk, pk . Like the security notion in [8] , here, we also require that both pk and pk are corrupted, or both are uncorrupted.
• Re-signature O ReSign : On input (pk, pk , m, σ), where pk, pk were generated before by KeyGen. The adversary is given the re-signed signature σ = ReSign(ReKey(sk, sk ), pk, m, σ), where sk, sk are the secret keys that correspond to pk, pk .
• Signature O Sign : On input a public key pk, a message m, where pk was generated before by KeyGen.
The adversary is given the corresponding signature σ = Sign(sk, m), where sk is the secret key that correspond to pk. Forgery. The adversary outputs a message m * , a public key pk * , and a string σ * . The adversary succeeds if the following hold true:
is not a query to O ReSign , where ♦ denotes any public key, and denotes any signature.
The advantage of an adversary A in the above game is defined to be Adv A = Pr[A succeeds], where the probability is taken over all coin tosses made by the challenger and the adversary.
Bidirectional ID-based Proxy Re-Signature
Definition 2 (Bidirectional ID-based Proxy Re-Signature) A Bidirectional ID-based proxy re-signature scheme S consists of the following six random algorithms: Setup, Extract, ReKey, Sign, ReSign, and Verify where:
• (Setup, Extract, Sign, Verify) are the same as those in a standard ID-based signature 2 .
•
, the re-signature key generation algorithm, ReKey, outputs a key rk A↔B for the proxy, where
• On input rk A↔B , an identity ID A , a message m, and a signature σ, the re-signature algorithm, ReSign, We also define the security notion of bidirectional ID-based proxy re-signature with static corruption by a game between a challenger and an adversary.
Setup. The challenger runs Setup and obtains both the public parameters params and the master secret mk.
The adversary is given params but the master secret mk is kept by the challenger. Queries. The adversary adaptively makes a number of different queries to the challenger. Each query can be one of the following.
• Extract oracle for corrupted parties O Extract : On input an identity ID by the adversary, the challenger responds by running Extract(mk, ID), and sends the resulting private key d ID to the adversary.
• Re-Signature key Generation O ReKey : On input (ID A , ID B ) by the adversary, the challenger returns the re-signature key rk A↔B = ReKey(Extract(mk, ID A ), Extract(mk, ID B )). Here, we also require that both ID A and ID B are corrupted, or both are uncorrupted.
• Re-signature O ReSign : On input (ID A , ID B , m, σ), the adversary is given the re-signed signature
• Signature O Sign : On input an identity ID, a message m. The adversary is given the corresponding signature σ = Sign(Extract(mk, ID), m). Forgery. The adversary outputs a message m * , an identity ID * , and a string σ * . The adversary succeeds if the following hold:
is not a query to O ReSign , where ♦ denotes any identity, and denotes any signature.
Bilinear maps
In this subsection, we briefly review definitions about bilinear maps and bilinear map groups, which follow that in [7] . 1. G 1 and G 2 are two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime order p; 2. g is a generator of G 1 ; 3. e is a bilinear map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 . Let G 1 and G 2 be two groups as above. An admissible bilinear map is a map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: For all P, Q, R ∈ G 1 , e(P · Q, R) = e(P, R) · e(Q, R) and e(P, Q · R) = e(P, Q) · e(P, R).
where O is a point at infinity. We say that G 1 is a bilinear group if the group action in G 1 can be computed efficiently and there exists a group G 2 and an efficiently computable bilinear map as above.
The Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption (CDH)
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem. Let G be a group of prime order p and let g be a generator of G. The CDH problem is as follows: Given g, g a , g b for some a, b ∈ Z * p compute g ab . An algorithm A has
where the probability is over the random choice of a, b in Z * p , the random choice of g ∈ G * , and the random bits of A.
Definition 3
We say that the (ε, t)-CDH assumption holds in G if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least ε in solving the CDH problem in G.
3 Bidirectional Proxy Re-signature Schemes 3.1 S mb : Multi-Use Bidirectional Scheme
We now present a new multi-use bidirectional proxy re-signature scheme, denoted as S mb , using the signature scheme due to Waters [19] . This scheme requires a bilinear map, as discussed in Section 2. We assume that the messages can be represented as bit strings of length n m , which is unrelated to p. We can achieve this by a collision-resistant hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} nm . KeyGen: On input the security parameter 1 k , it chooses two groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order p = Θ(2 k ), such that an admissible pairing e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 can be constructed and chooses a generator g of G 1 . Furthermore, it selects a random a from Z p , and n m + 2 random number (g 2 , u , u 1 , · · · , u nm ) from G 1 , and output the key pair pk = g 1 = g a and sk = a, the public parameters (G 1 , G 2 , e, g 2 , u , u 1 , · · · , u nm ). ReKey: On input two secret keys sk A = a, sk B = b, output the re-signature key rk A→B = b/a mod p.
(Note that we make use of the same method and assumptions in [2] to get the re-signature key, we refer the reader to [2] 
ReSign: On input a re-signature key rk A→B , a public key pk A , a signature σ A , and a n m -bit message m, check that Verify(pk A , m, σ A ) = 1. If σ A does not verify, output ⊥; otherwise, output σ B = σ
where r = rb/a mod p. Verify: On input a public key pk, a n m -bit message m, and a purported signature σ = (A, B), output 1, if e(pk, g 2 )e(B, w) = e(A, g) and 0 otherwise.
Theorem 1 (Security of S mb ) In the standard model, bidirectional proxy re-signature scheme S mb is correct and existentially unforgeable under the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption in G 1 ; that is, for random g ∈ G 1 , and x, y ∈ Z * p , give (g, g x , g y ), it is hard to compute g xy .
Proof. The correctness property is easily observable. We show security following the approaches in [19, 15] , especially the one in [15] . If there exists an adversary A that can break the above proxy re-signature scheme with non-negligible probability ε in time t after making at most q S sign queries, q RS resign queries, q K (un)corrupted key queries, and q RK rekey queries, then there also exists an adversary B that can solve the CDH problem in G 1 with probability
, where ρ and τ are the time for a multiplication and an exponentiation in G 1 , respectively.
On input (g, g a , g b ), the CDH adversary B simulates a bidirectional proxy re-signature security game for A as follows:
To prepare the simulation, B first sets l m = 2(q S + q RS ), and randomly chooses a number k m , such that 0 ≤ k m ≤ n m , and l m (n m + 1) < p. B then chooses n m + 1 random numbers x , x i (i = 1, . . . , n m ) from Z lm . Lastly, B chooses n m + 1 random numbers y , y i (i = 1, . . . , n m ) from Z p .
To make expression simpler, we use the following notations:
Now, B sets the public parameters:
Note that for any message m, there exists the following equation:
Queries: B builds the following oracles:
O U KeyGen : B chooses a random x i ∈ Z * p , and outputs pk i = (g a ) x i . O CKeyGen : B chooses a random x i ∈ Z * p , and outputs (pk i , sk i ) = (g x i , x i ). O Sign : On input (pk i , m), if pk i is corrupted, B returns the signature σ = (g x j 2 w r , g r ), where w = u i∈U u i . Otherwise, B performs as follows.
• If F (m) ≡ 0 mod p, B picks a random r ∈ Z p and computes the signature as,
Forr = r − a/F (m), we have that
)r, and g
which shows that σ has the correct signature as in the actual scheme.
• If F (m) ≡ 0(modp), B is unable to compute the signature σ and must abort the simulation. O ReKey : On input (pk i , pk j ), if pk i and pk j are both corrupted or both uncorrupted, B returns rk i→j = (x j /x i ) mod p; else, this input is illegal. O ReSign : On input (pk i , pk j , m, σ). If Verify(pk i , m, σ) = 1, B outputs ⊥. Otherwise, B does:
• If pk i and pk j are both corrupted or both uncorrupted, output ReSign(O ReKey (pk i , pk j ), pk i , m, σ).
• else, output O Sign (pk j , m).
Forgery: If B does not abort as a consequence of one of the queries above, A will, with probability at least ε, return a message m * and a valid forgery σ * = (A * , B * ) on m * . If F (m * ) ≡ 0 mod p, B aborts. Otherwise, the forgery must be of the form, for some r * ∈ Z p ,
To solve the CDH instance, B outputs (A * ) · (B * ) −J(m * ) = g ab . To conclude, we bound the probability that B completes the simulation without aborting. For the simulation to complete without aborting, we require that all sign and resign queries on a message m have F (m) ≡ 0 mod p, and that F (m * ) ≡ 0 mod p.
Let m 1 , . . . , m q Q be the messages appearing in sign queries or resign queries not involving the message m * . Clearly, q Q ≤ q S + q RS . We define the events E i , E i , and E * as:
The probability of B not aborting is Pr
It is easy to see that the events (
From l m (n m + 1) < p and x and x i (i = 1, . . . , n m ) are all from Z lm , we have 0 ≤ l m k m < p and 0 ≤ x + i∈U x i < p. Then it is easy to see that F (m) ≡ 0 mod p implies that F (m) ≡ 0 mod l m . We can get that F (m) ≡ 0 mod l m implies that F (m) ≡ 0 mod p. Hence, we have:
and l m = 2(q S + q RS ) as in the simulation. Hence, we get that
Since there are O(n m ) and O(n m ) multiplications in sign queries and resign queries, respectively, and O(1), O(1), and O(1) exponentiations in sign queries, resign queries and (un)corrupted key queries, respectively, hence the time complexity of B is t + O((q S + q RS )n m ρ + (q S + q RS + q K )τ ).
Thus, the theorem follows.
Discussion of Scheme S mb : This scheme is transparent, since the signature from Sign algorithm is the same of that from ReSign algorithm. This fact also implies that this scheme is multi-use. Furthermore, it is easy to see that rk A→B = 1/rk B→A , which shows the scheme is bidirectional. Last, since each user just stores one signing key, the scheme is also key optimal.
S id−mb : ID-based Multi-Use Bidirectional Scheme
In this subsection, we will extend S mb to an ID-based multi-use bidirectional scheme, denoted as S id−mb . The scheme is consisted of six algorithms. In the following we assume that all identities and messages are n idbit and n m -bit strings, respectively. We can achieve this by applying two collision-resistant hash functions, H id : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n id , and H m : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} nm .
Setup: On input the security parameter 1 k , it chooses groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order p = Θ(2 k ), such that an admissible pairing e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 can be constructed and pick a generator g of G 1 . Furthermore, choose a random number α from Z p , compute g 1 = g α , and then choose u , u i (i = 1, · · · , n id ), v , and
The public parameters are (
) and the master secret key is α.
Extract: On input an n id -bit identity ID, output the corresponding private key d id ,
where r id is a random number from Z p , U ⊂ {1, · · · , n id } is the set of indices i such that u[i] = 1, and u[i] is the i-th bit of ID.
Rekey: On input two private keys
A ) and
B ), output the re-signature key
).
(Note that we make use of the same method and assumptions in [2] to get the re-signature key.)
Sign: On input a private key
id ) and a n m -bit message m, output
where r m is a random number from ReSign: On input a re-signature key rk A→B = (
), an n id -bit identity ID A , a signature σ A , and an
B , g rm+∆r ), where ∆r is a random number from Z p .
Verify: On input an n id -bit identity ID, an n m -bit message m, and a purported signature σ = (A, B, C), output 1, if e(A, g) = e(g 2 , g 1 )e(u i∈U u i , B)e(v i∈V v i , C) and 0 otherwise.
Theorem 2 (Security of S id−mb ) In the standard model, ID-based bidirectional proxy re-signature scheme S id−mb is correct and existentially unforgeable under the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption in G 1 ; that is, for random g ∈ G 1 , and x, y ∈ Z * p , give (g, g x , g y ), it is hard to compute g xy .
Proof. Firstly, we use the following equations to show S id−mb 's correctness.
And then we show security as in Theorem 1, the approach is also based on that of [19, 15] . We show if there exists any adversary A that can break the external security of the above proxy re-signature scheme with non-negligible probability ε in time t after making at most q E extract queries, q S sign queries, and q RS resign queries, there must exist an adversary B that solves the CDH problem in G 1 with probability On input (g, g a , g b ), the CDH adversary B simulates an ID-based bidirectional proxy re-signature security game for A as follows:
To prepare the simulation, B first sets l id = 2(q E + q S + q RS + 2q RK ) and l m = 2(q S + q RS ), and randomly chooses two numbers k id and k m , such that 0 ≤ k id ≤ n id , l id (n id + 1) < p, 0 ≤ k m ≤ n m , and l m (n m + 1) < p. B then chooses n id + 1 random numbers x , x i (i = 1, · · · , n id ) from Z l id , and n m + 1 random numbers z , z i (i = 1, · · · , n m ) from Z m . Lastly, B chooses n id + n m + 2 random numbers y , y i (i = 1, · · · , n id ), w ,
Note that for any identity ID and message m, there exists the following equations:
Queries: B builds the following oracles:
O Extract : On input ID, if ID is uncorrupted and not issued by B itself, then this input is illegal; else, B computes F (ID). If F (ID) ≡ 0 mod p, B aborts; otherwise, B computes the corresponding private key:
where r id is a random number from Z p . Writingr id = r id − a/F (ID), we have
and d
(2)
Hence, from the adversary's point of view, all private keys computed by B will be indistinguishable from the keys generated by the real PKG. O Sign : On input (ID, m), B first computes F (ID).
• If F (ID) ≡ 0 mod p, B can just compute the private key corresponding to identity ID as in an extract query, and then use the Sign algorithm to create a signature on m.
• 
where r m is a random number from Z p , andr m = r m − a/K(m). The last equation shows that the signatures computed by B are indistinguishable to that generated by the real user, from A's point of view.
O ReKey : On input (ID i , ID j ), if one of ID i and ID j is corrupted, and the other is uncorrupted, then the input is illegal; else, B does: 3. rk i→j = (
, g r id i −r id j ), where I ∈ ID i denotes the value of I-bit of ID i is 1.
• If (ID i , ID j ) are both corrupted, then
• If ID i and ID j are both corrupted or uncorrupted, output
Forgery: If B does not abort as a consequence of any queries above, A will, with probability at least ε, return a message m * , an identity ID * , and a valid forgery
Otherwise, the forgery must be of the form, for some r * id , r * m ∈ Z p ,
To solve the CDH instance, B outputs (
To conclude, we bound the probability that B completes the simulation without aborting. For the simulation to complete without aborting, we require that all extract queries on an identity ID have F (ID) ≡ 0 mod p, that all sign and resign queries on a message (ID, m) have F (ID) ≡ 0 mod p or K(m) ≡ 0 mod p, that all rekey queries on identity pair (ID i , ID j ) have F (ID i ) ≡ 0 mod p and F (ID j ) ≡ 0 mod p, and that F (ID * ) ≡ 0 mod p and K(m * ) ≡ 0 mod p.
Let ID 1 , · · · , ID q ID be the identities appearing in extract queries, sign queries or resign queries not involving the identity ID * , and m 1 , · · · , m q M be the messages appearing in sign queries or resign queries involving the identity ID * . Clearly, q ID ≤ q E + q S + q RS + 2q RK and q M ≤ q S + q RS . We define the events
, and E * K as: The probability of B not aborting is
, and E * K are independent. From l id (n id + 1) < p and x and x i (i = 1, · · · , n id ) are all from Z l id , we have 0 ≤ l id k id < p and 0 ≤ x + i∈U x i < p. Then it is easy to see that F (ID) ≡ 0 mod p implies that F (ID) ≡ 0 mod l id . We can get that F (ID) ≡ 0 mod l id implies that F (m) ≡ 0 mod p. Hence, we have: Pr[E F i ] ≥ Pr[E n id +1 (since l id = 2(q E + q S + q RS + 2q RK )) and Pr[
= 1/2 ( since l id = 2(q E + q S + q RS + 2q RK )).
Similarly, we get that
and Pr[
Hence, we get that
(q E +q S +q RS +2q RK )(q S +q RS )(n id+1 )(nm+1) . Since there are O(n id ), O(n id ), O(n id +n m ) and O(n id +n m ) multiplications in extract queries, rekey queries, sign queries and resign queries, respectively, and O(1), O(1), O(1), and O(1) exponentiations in extract queries, rekey queries, sign queries and resign queries, respectively, hence the time complexity of B is t + O(((q E + q RK )n id + (q S + q RS )(n id + n m ))ρ + (q E + q S + q RS + q RK )τ ).
Discussion of Scheme S id−mb : As S mb , S id−mb is bidirectional, multi-use, transparent, and key optimal.
Conclusions
We have presented the first two proxy re-signature schemes which are proven secure in the standard model. Especially, the second one is an ID-based proxy re-signature scheme. Both of them are computational efficient, only two exponentiations in G 1 in Sign and ReSign algorithms. However, their public parameters' size is relatively large. We can make a tradeoff between the public parameters' size and the security reduction by using the techniques of Naccache [14] and Sarkar and Chatterjee [16] to reduce its size. Note that, our proposals are only proven secure with static corruption not the adaptive corruption, we left it as the future work.
